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Abstract
The United States Army currently employs a shoot-shoot-look firing policy for
air defense. As the Army moves to a networked defense-in-depth strategy, this policy
will not provide optimal results for managing interceptor inventories in a conflict to
minimize the damage to defended assets. The objective for air and missile defense is
to identify the firing policy for interceptor allocation that minimizes expected total
cost of damage to defended assets. This dynamic weapon target assignment prob-
lem is formulated first as a Markov decision process (MDP) and then approximate
dynamic programming (ADP) is used to solve problem instances based on a represen-
tative scenario. Least squares policy evaluation (LSPE) and least squares temporal
difference (LSTD) algorithms are employed to determine the best approximate poli-
cies possible. An experimental design is conducted to investigate problem features
such as conflict duration, attacker and defender weapon sophistication, and defended
asset values. The LSPE and LSTD algorithm results are compared to two benchmark
policies (e.g., firing one or two interceptors at each incoming tactical ballistic missile
(TBM)). Results indicate that ADP policies outperform baseline polices when con-
flict duration is short and attacker weapons are sophisticated. Results also indicate
that firing one interceptor at each TBM (regardless of inventory status) outperforms
the tested ADP policies when conflict duration is long and attacker weapons are less
sophisticated.
Key words: air and missile defense, dynamic weapon target assignment problem,
Markov decision processes, approximate dynamic programming, approximate policy
iteration, least squares policy evaluation, least squares temporal difference
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AN APPROXIMATE DYNAMIC PROGRAMMING APPROACH
FOR COMPARING FIRING SOLUTIONS IN A NETWORKED AIR DEFENSE
ENVIRONMENT
I. INTRODUCTION
Over 35 countries have theater ballistic missile (TBM) capabilities. Some TBMs
have ranges of up to 3000 kilometers and the ability to deliver payloads of 1000 kilo-
grams [1]. Some nations (e.g., North Korea and Iran) stockpile less sophisticated
versions while other nations (e.g., China) continue to advance their technology to
include faster moving missiles, missiles with multiple reentry vehicles, and maneuver-
able missiles capable of significantly altering their ballistic trajectory.
Throughout the first half of 2016 North Korea launched numerous TBMs to in-
clude a Musudan Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile in June that traveled almost
250 miles before crashing into the sea between North Korea and Japan [5]. Secretary
of Defense Ash Carter affirmed the United States commitment to TBM defense in
response to this launch [5]. North Korea then fired a KN-11 ballistic missile from a
submarine on July 9th, further provoking tensions in the region [14]. In response to
these launches, the United States and South Korea agreed to move a Terminal High
Altitude Air Defense (THAAD) battery to the peninsula on July 13th [13]. This move
has been highly criticized by Chinese and Russian officials as a destabilizing action
[12]. These events, as well as the continued military presence of the United States in
the Middle East, underscore a critical need for an intelligent TBM defense policy.
The United States divides its TBM defense into three segments: the boost defense
segment, the mid-course defense segment, and the terminal defense segment [1]. The
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Missile Defense Agency (MDA) has expended significant resources on boost segment
defense, yet it remains difficult to intercept TBMs with any level of accuracy when
they are in the boost phase of their trajectory. Therefore, the MDA limits efforts in
this segment mostly to providing early launch detection. This policy is underscored by
a 2012 National Research Council report that stated, “Boost-phase missile defense is
not practical or cost-effective under real-world conditions for the foreseeable future”
[7]. Budget cuts within the MDA have reduced its budget by 23 percent over the
past eight years from 11 billion dollars to 8.5 billion dollars. Former MDA director
Lt. Gen. Trey Obering (ret.) recently called for more aggressive research into boost
phase defense stating,
“Even if we’re only talking about North Korea and Iran, we have to invest
in this R&D to keep up with that limited threat, because those threats
are evolving and they’re becoming more mature, and then, of course, if
we’re talking about a very aggressive China or a more belligerent Russia,
we’ve got a long way to go to address that as well.”[23]
Unfortunately, the boost phase limitations reduce intercept opportunities to the mid-
course and terminal phase of the TBM’s trajectory.
The Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense system provides a mid-course defense with the
Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) interceptor. The United States Navy currently employs
33 Aegis capable platforms - five cruisers and 28 destroyers - and significant efforts
are underway to place the Aegis ashore variant in high risk areas. The Aegis began
development under the Reagan administration, performing its first successful flight
test intercept in 2002 and becoming fully operational in 2005 [1].
The terminal defense segment offers the highest probability of intercept by current
air and missile defense systems, but also portends the highest threat to the defended
assets. The United States currently relies on the Patriot air defense system, the
THAAD system, and the Aegis with its Standard Missile-2 (SM-2) interceptor for
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terminal defense [1]. Raytheon designed the original Patriot in 1969 and it made
its first successful intercept in 1975 [1]. Although the system has undergone several
technological updates to include enhanced computing, new interceptors, and most re-
cently an update to the radar’s front end, it is still heavily reliant on 1960’s technology
[1]. Lockheed Martin designed the THAAD in 1987 and it successfully intercepted a
test target in 1999 [1].
These three systems indicate two major concerns with the United States missile
defense capabilities. Current systems are all based on thirty-year old or older tech-
nology, and there is at least a ten-year lag between system design and initial fielding
of the system. In 1999, the United States Army began to seek a replacement for the
Patriot with a greater detection range and a 360 degree radar capability. Lockheed
Martin won the contract for an international venture called the Medium Extended Air
Defense System (MEADS) in 2005. Though this program showed promise in detec-
tion range, networkability, and multi-function 360 degree capability, it was canceled
in 2015 after the Army expended over two billion dollars on the project [1].
The United States and its allies face not only an ever growing enemy arsenal of
TBMs, but also an ever improving TBM technology impelled by countries like China
and Iran. With the loss of the MEADS program, the United States must rely on
outdated technology to counter both mass attacks by unsophisticated TBMs and
pointed attacks by very technologically sophisticated TBMs. Moreover, the United
States will likely not experience a vast improvement in TBM defense capabilities for
a decade due to the long lag time required for the procurement process. This forces
the United States to rely more heavily upon the segmented defense-in-depth strategy
advocated by the MDA as it cannot rely solely on the Patriot or the THAAD to defend
assets in the terminal phase. Paramount to this strategy is the ability to network the
limited air and missile defense assets available together in order to provide a common
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air picture, provide early detection, and allow for a larger and more tailored coverage
area. The United States Army is currently developing, under contract with Northrup
Grumman, the Integrated Air and Missile Defense Battle Command System (IBCS)
[1]. Once fielded, this networked command and control system will allow individual
systems like the Patriot and the THAAD to network together and truly provide an
integrated defense-in-depth.
Although a networked system of air defense assets improves the ability to detect,
identify, track, and engage an enemy TBM, it also creates the added burden of decid-
ing which air and missile defense system within the network should engage the TBMs
and with how many interceptors. A fundamental tension exists between the potential
catastrophic damage caused by TBMs and the extremely limited number of air and
missile defense system interceptors available. Given an air and missile defense battery
versus a single salvo of incoming missiles, formulating and solving a static weapon-
target assignment problem could determine the best firing solution to protect the
defended asset. Unfortunately, in a high intensity conflict, the air and missile defense
battery must expect numerous salvos of incoming TBMs. The defender must now
consider how many interceptors to fire at the current wave, while anticipating future
attacks. Addressing a multi-salvo missile defense situation changes the problem from
a static weapon-target assignment problem to a dynamic weapon-target assignment
problem. The problem is further complicated when considering multiple air and mis-
sile defense batteries with overlapping target coverage and the ability to engage the
same set of incoming TBMs with differing probabilities of kill.
Previous work examines situations concerning the location of integrated air and
missile defense systems assets (e.g., [9]) and the control of such assets in a multi-
salvo engagement (e.g., [6]). However, such work assumes the air and missile defense
systems operate in parallel (i.e., they are capable of engaging the same targets at the
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same time). This assumption is somewhat unrealistic due to the limited number of
air defense batteries available for asset coverage. There are very few assets, if any,
that would be defended by multiple air defense systems of the same type. However, it
is possible that an asset will be defended by multiple air defense systems at different
segments within the MDA’s defense strategy. This defense-in-depth strategy assumes
the individual air and missile defense systems operate in series when engaging TBMs.
For example, an Aegis may have the ability to engage during the mid-course segment
at one point in time, and a THAAD or Patriot system may have the ability to engage
during the terminal phase at a later point in time.
Due to the extremely high speed of TBMs, the air defense community generally
adopts a shoot-shoot-look policy in the terminal phase [1]. This policy allows air
defense assets to fire two interceptors at an incoming missile before it penetrates the
defended assets “keep out zone.” This shoot-shoot-look policy increases the probabil-
ity of a kill, but it is much more resource intensive than the policy of shoot-look-shoot
where the decision maker is able to fire one interceptor, assess the battle damage, and
then if need be, fire another interceptor [8]. Knowing that the defender will always
fire two interceptors in a shoot-shoot-look policy or only one in a shoot-look-shoot
policy can significantly decrease the action space for a dynamic program.
An appropriate set of research questions of interest to the missile defense com-
munity is as follows. Does a hybrid of these policies exist that performs closer to the
optimal policy and that can be more reasonably implemented in an actual combat
environment? Does a networked air and missile defense allow for better management
of resources and/or less expected cost to the defended assets? Is it better to have
a more effective air and missile defense system at the mid-course or in the terminal
phase? How do different types of incoming TBMs affect the firing policy? How does
a defended asset’s remaining value affect the firing policy?
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This thesis provides two ways to address this networked, defense-in-depth, air
and missile defense problem and answer the research questions of note. First, a
Markov decision process (MDP) model is developed that allows sequential decisions
to be made as the defender encounters a salvo of incoming TBMs by the first air
and missile defense asset (during the mid-course segment), then at a later decision
epoch another air defense asset encounters the salvo (during the terminal segment).
This model allows the system to determine the optimal firing solution over an infinite
horizon of decision epochs. If the series of air defense assets fail to destroy all TBMs in
an incoming salvo, the TBMs will decrease the defended assets health with a specified
probability of hit. The system continues to evolve until it reaches an absorbing state
wherein all defended assets are destroyed. Although formulating and solving this
MDP provides the optimal solution, it may take hours to determine the solution for
practically-sized problem instances. Moreover, the solution is often too complicated
to be administered by air defense coordinators.
Therefore, we utilize approximate dynamic programming (ADP) to develop strate-
gies based on approximation algorithms. This allows for attaining solutions to larger
problem instances while handling dimensionality issues that might otherwise make
the problem computationally intractable. To answer our relevant research questions,
we employ a least squares policy evaluation (LSPE) and a least squares temporal
difference (LSTD) ADP approach. We compare these ADP solutions to three ‘closed
loop’ policies based on current doctrine. We investigate the ‘closed loop’ policy of
shooting one interceptor at each incoming TBM and the ‘closed loop’ policy of shoot-
ing two interceptors at each incoming TBM (as long as the inventory of interceptors
allow). We also investigate a hybrid of these two policies wherein the defender fires
one interceptor at traditional TBMs and two interceptors at MeRV TBMs at the mid-
course phase while shooting two interceptors at traditional TBMs and one interceptor
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at the MeRV TBMs at the terminal phase. Although this hybrid ‘closed loop’ policy
requires some level of radar discrimination of the incoming TBMs, it has performed
the best in initial policy evaluation simulations.
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 presents a literature
review for the dynamic weapon target assignment problem and ADP. Chapter 3
offers a more extensive description of the networked air and missile defense problem.
Chapter 4 presents the MDP model formulation as well as the ADP solution approach.
Chapter 5 describes the findings when applying the aforementioned methodology.
Chapter 6 provides conclusions and suggested future research efforts.
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW
Two areas of literature inform the development and analysis of the networked air
defense in depth problem. The first area concerns the weapon-target assignment prob-
lem (WTAP). The second area involves approximate dynamic programming (ADP).
2.1 WTAP
The WTAP dates back to the 1950s when Manne [17] developed a linear pro-
gramming approximation to solve the problem. Even then he noted that for military
applications a simultaneous decision is unrealistic and should be modeled in a sequen-
tial manner. This distinction led to the development of two primary classes of the
WTAP, the static and the dynamic.
Xin et al. [27] describe the classes as follows. In a static WTAP, all targets are
known, and all weapons are assigned to the targets in a single stage. In a dynamic
WTAP, the decisions occur over many stages, so at one decision point weapons are
assigned to the currently known targets and then a new set of targets is presented.
2.2 Static WTAP
The static WTAP investigates the assignment of weapons to targets without re-
garding the impact of time. Consider the following situation as a motivating example.
Suppose there are 10 tanks and 15 anti-tank teams that represent the weapons. In
this class of WTAP, the battle manager selects the weapon-target assignment decision
that maximizes the expected value of the destroyed tanks based on each anti-tank
weapon’s associated probability of kill. Before the advent of modern computers,
problems like this proved difficult and time consuming to solve. Today large-scale
instances of static WTAP can be solved rather easily with linear programming and
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heuristic algorithms. While interesting in some cases, this class of problem does not
achieve the level of detail required for realistic air defense related problems. Indeed,
very few situations exist in which an air defense battle manager would have the ability
to consider all incoming TBMs at one point in time and assign interceptors to maxi-
mize a selected optimality criterion. Instead, the battle manager will likely observe a
single incoming salvo of TBMs at a time and be forced to make the decision on how
many interceptors to fire at the incoming salvo while knowing that future salvos are
likely. The number and size of incoming salvos can be informed by knowing what
phase of a conflict the battle manager is in and by having intelligence on how many
threat TBMs the enemy has placed within range of the defended asset. Knowing this
information and seeking to formulate a more realistic problem class takes us to the
dynamic WTAP.
2.3 Dynamic WTAP
Similar to the static WTAP, the dynamic class seeks to assign weapons to targets
in the most effective manner to ensure the highest probability of a kill, the greatest
decremented value of the target, or the least decremented value of defended assets.
Different in this problem class, as compared to the static case, is that the decisions are
made in a sequential manner as more information presents itself. Consider the tank
example described in Section 2.2. In a dynamic WTAP, the battle manager does not
consider the simultaneous engagement of all 10 tanks. Instead, the battle manager
might observe a grouping of five tanks and be able to assign some number of the anti-
tank weapons to those five tanks, knowing that future tank sightings are likely. Once
assigned the battle manager then moves to the next decision epoch wherein another
grouping of tanks is presented, and the assignment decision must be made again.
The dynamic WTAP allows a much more realistic representation of combat decision
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making under uncertainty. However, it also makes the problem far more complex and
with each level of complexity the problem becomes more computationally intractable.
Uncertainty in an air defense related problem comes from several sources. The
battle manager may not know the number and types of the TBMs the enemy will
fire during any given salvo. The duration of the engagement, represented by the
number of incoming salvos, may be uncertain. The probability of detect for the
battle manager’s radar systems and the probability of kill for any fired interceptors
model inherent uncertainties present in the problem. The accuracy of any networked
capabilities may also be uncertain. Exploring just a few of these uncertainties creates
a very large problem instance. Due to the nature of air defense, the decisions of how
many interceptors to fire must be made in a matter of minutes, if not seconds, which
requires any solution method to be implemented quickly. Optimally solving large-
scale dynamic WTAPs instances can take computers several hours if not days. This
challenge suggests the appropriateness of using approximate dynamic programming
to implement algorithms that will provide high-quality solutions in very short periods
of time.
Leboucher et al.[16] ignore the general assumption in a dynamic WTAP that the
defender knows exactly what asset the TBM is targeting and instead only reveal a
particular region that the TBM is targeting. This feature adds realism to the air
defense problem in that even though radars can accurately predict a TBM’s general
path, they cannot truly assess what target the TBM will hit during the boost- or mid-
course phase. In this thesis this uncertainty is addressed by assigning a probability
that an incoming TBM hits each asset. Modeling this problem feature allows a TBM
to be ignored by all defending assets and still not destroy its target.
The dynamic WTAP can be solved through heuristic methods such as the work
done by Xin et al. [26] and Hoisen et al. [10]. Although these authors do not give
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the actual optimal solutions, this is common due to the complexity of the problem.
These problems can be solved using genetic algorithms such as the anytime algorithm
created by Wu et al. [25]. They developed an algorithm that evolved over time as
more information became available. This algorithm improved gradually but always
had a reasonable and feasible decision ready for implementation. The problem can
also be solved by formulating an integer linear program like the one designed by
Karasakal [11], and though this paper considered both point and area defense, it did
so by making the assumption of a shoot-look-shoot policy that severely limits the
action space and therefore the true optimal solution.
Bertsekas et al. [3] discuss a much more complex WTAP than that of the single
weapon static case. In this case the defender must decide how many weapons to
assign to each target in the current wave of attack and how many to hold for later
waves. Due to the curse of dimensionality, which denies the ability to find an exact
solution in medium- or large-scale problems, the authors use neuro-dynamic program-
ming approach to help handle the increased number of dimensions. This approach
determines a sub-optimal yet high-quality solution to the problem, and the authors
develop four policies to approximate the solution to the dynamic WTAP.
Davis et al. [6] discussed the dynamic WTAP from the defender’s perspective,
considering a smart attacker that knew the outcome of each salvo and fired appro-
priately at surviving targets. They allowed an overlapping of each air and missile
defense site’s coverage area so one asset could be defended by two SAM sites. This
allowed for the investigation of optimal firing policies when one SAM site was low on
interceptors and another was not, or when some defended assets had lower values and
others had higher values. Their problem instance was small enough to find an exact
solution; they also investigated the quality of ADP approaches.
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2.4 ADP
Assigning interceptors to missiles in a dynamic WTAP is a stochastic process that
must be performed under uncertainty. Formulation of an MDP model allows us to
determine the optimal decision now (i.e., for the current salvo) while accounting for
the uncertain future salvos. Unfortunately, because of the curse of dimensionality, we
are unable to quickly find an optimal solution to large-sized problems of this class.
Therefore, for the dynamic WTAP we employ ADP techniques. Powell [18] provides
a thorough starting point for ADP procedures. Earlier works include Bertsekas and
Tsitsiklis [2] and Sutton et al. [22].
We can achieve solutions through two different algorithmic approaches: approx-
imate value iteration (AVI) and approximate policy iteration (API). For the partic-
ular dynamic WTAP variant examined in this thesis, we utilize an API algorithmic
strategy to map the system state (i.e., incoming salvo make up, asset health, and in-
terceptor inventory) to the action (i.e., how many interceptors to fire at each missile)
in order to maximize the expected value of the defender’s surviving assets.
Powell [20] describes four different policies for solving an ADP. The first policy
he addressed was a myopic cost function wherein the defender attempts to minimize
damage for just one decision epoch. Next, he described a look-ahead policy wherein
the defender would start to plan over a set number of decision epochs, but only takes
the action for the current period. Some problems benefit from using policy function
approximations such as look-up-tables, neural networks, or linear regression. For the
DWTAP a defender might have the policy that when it is above a prescribed threshold
interceptor inventory it utilizes a shoot-shoot-look policy and when it is below that
inventory level it uses a shoot-look-shoot policy. The final policy discussed by Powell
[20] is based on value function approximations. For our problem, we utilize a value
function approximation scheme, adopting a basis function approach to determine the
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value of the post-decision state. Van Roy et al. [24] used a modified Bellman’s
equation with the post-decision decision state to reduce the outcome space making
large-scale problems more easily solved. As we conduct the policy evaluation part of
our API algorithm, we update the value function approximation using least squares
temporal difference (LSTD) learning. Bradtke and Barto [4] showed that LSTD was
an efficient algorithm to find an approximate solution to a fixed policy. Lagoudakis
and Parr [15] advanced this method as they investigated the interactions of state and
action pairs.
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III. Methodology
3.1 Problem Description
Theater ballistic missiles (TBMs) and cruise missiles (CMs) present an extremely
dangerous threat to United States forces in the early stages of combat. Although
efforts are made to destroy enemy TBM and CM stockpiles before moving friendly
forces into a protected area of interest, the United States cannot expect to completely
negate the enemy’s use of these weapons. While the United States has several options
for defending assets from TBMs and CMs, such protective systems are available in
relatively small quantities. This forces the United States to leave some assets unpro-
tected and nearly guarantees that assets will only be protected by one air defense
asset.
Over the past several years the Army has worked on developing a networked
air defense capability that will allow available air defense assets to work in concert,
providing defense in depth as a TBM or CM moves through a protected area. This
capability gives the defender several decisions to make when developing an air defense
plan. This includes determining which assets will be defended and by what type of
air defense system, how many interceptors to provide each air defense site, how many
interceptors to fire at a given salvo, and what firing policy to utilize.
In our problem instance of interest, the defender has two assets to protect, each
with a co-located air defense system (i.e., surface to air missile (SAM) site) providing
terminal phase protection. An air defense system is also located closer to the enemy
launch site, providing mid-course protection. Each friendly asset has an associated
value and health state. As asset’s health state is decremented if the asset is hit by
an incoming missile. Each SAM site has a predetermined number of interceptors
that is not replenished during the engagement. An asset, but not the co-located air
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defense asset, is destroyed if its health state decreases to zero. The attacker has
predetermined numbers of two types of TBMs that are fired in salvos. The number of
salvos is uncertain from the perspective of the defender. The attacker does not know if
its previous salvos successfully destroyed the defended asset so it could continue to fire
missiles at a completely destroyed asset. The two types of TBMs fired by the attacker
include a traditional TBM and a TBM with multiple reentry vehicles (MeRV). Once
the attack commences, the defender decides how many interceptors to fire from the
mid-course air defense system and, if it declines to fire or if the interceptors miss, it
must decide how many interceptors to fire from the terminal phase defense systems.
If the salvo contains a MeRV TBM and is not destroyed by the mid-course defense
system this TBM will split into three missiles (targets). The defender seeks a policy
that minimizes the expected value of the assets remaining after all incoming salvos.
3.2 Methodology
This section describes the MDP model formulation of the DWTAP and provides
the mathematical underpinning for the ADP algorithm discussed later in this chapter.
MDP Formulation
The MDP model is formulated in the following manner.
1. Let T = {1, 2, ..., T}, T ≤ ∞ be the set of decision epochs.
2. The state space consists of three components: the status of each asset, the
inventory of each SAM site, and the number of TBMs in each SAM’s area of
responsibility.
(a) The asset status component is defined as
At = (Ati)i∈A ≡ (At1, At2, ..., At|A|),
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whereA = {1, 2, ..., |A|} is the set of all assets, andAti ∈ {0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1}.
Ati is the health status of asset i ∈ A at decision epoch t and shows what
percentage of the asset remains.
(b) The SAM inventory status is defined as
Rt = (Rti)i∈A ≡ (Rt1, Rt2, ..., Rt|A|),
where Rti ∈ {0, 1, ..., ri}, and ri = initial inventory of interceptors at SAM
site i ∈ A. Rti is the number of interceptors at SAM site i ∈ A at decision
epoch t.
(c) Let M̂tj = {1, 2, ..., |M̂tj|} be the set of all fired attacker missiles of type
j ∈ J at decision epoch t, where J is the set of all TBM types that can
be fired by the attacker. For example, j ∈ J indicates whether the missile
is a traditional TBM or a MeRV and its location. M̂tj is the collection
of observed incoming TBMs of type j ∈ J that must be targeted by the
defense at time t. The attack salvo is expressed as
M̂t = (M̂tji)j∈J ,i∈A,
where M̂tji ⊆ M̂tj is the set of missiles of type j ∈ J ′ targeting asset
i ∈ A at decision epoch t. The information provided by M̂t is available to
the defender at time t.
Using these components, we define St = (At, Rt, M̂t) ∈ S as the state of the
system at decision epoch t, where S is the set of all possible states.
3. At each epoch t, the defender must decide how many to assign to each TBM
targeting an asset. The defender must make this choice from among the SAM
sites that have the given asset within their respective protection radii. We
can deduce a coverage matrix for the entire defended area from the a priori
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placement of SAM sites relative to the cities. From this coverage matrix, we
can determine which SAM sites can intercept each incoming missile. Let xtijk ∈
N0 be the number of interceptors fired by SAM site i ∈ A against missile
k ∈ M̂Atij at decision epoch t, where M̂Atij is defined as the set of missiles of
type j ∈ J that can be intercepted by SAM site i at decision epoch t. Let
xt = (xtijk)i∈A,j∈J ,k∈M̂Atij
denote our decision vector. We define the set of all
feasible defender actions (i.e., assignment of interceptors to missiles) as
XSt = {xt :
∑
j∈J
∑
k∈M̂Atij
xtijk ≤ Rti, ∀ i ∈ A},
where the constraint
∑
j∈J
∑
k∈M̂Atij
xtijk ≤ Rti ensures that each SAM site i ∈ A
cannot fire more interceptors than it has in inventory.
4. The transition functions explain how the the system evolves as new information
becomes known [19]. We define the asset status transition function as
At+1,i =

0 if Ati = 0,
Ât+1,i(xt) otherwise,
∀i ∈ A,
where Ât+1,i(xt) is a random variable representing the status of each asset i ∈ A
after salvo M̂t and the interceptor allocation decision xt. This information
depends on xt since the number of interceptors fired at the inbound TBMs affects
an asset’s health status. We define the inventory status transition function as
Rt+1,i = Rti −
∑
j∈J
∑
k∈M̂Atij
xtijk, ∀ i ∈ A,
and note that the asset status transition function is stochastic whereas the
inventory status transition function is deterministic since there is no probability
associated with firing the interceptor —once the decision to fire the interceptor
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is made we reduce the inventory. Concerning the transition of the attacker
missiles status, let M̂t+1, j(xt) denote a random variable representing the status
of incoming TBMs of type j ∈ J ′ ⊂ J , where J ′ is the set of types with
terminal locations.
The state transition function is defined as St+1 = S
M(St, xt,Wt+1), where
Wt+1 = Ât+1, M̂t+1. Wt+1 represents all the information (i.e., asset status and
attacker salvo) that becomes known at decision epoch t+ 1.
5. At each decision epoch t, the defender incurs an uncertain, immediate cost as a
result of its decision. We define this cost as Ĉ(St, xt, Ât+1,i) =
∑
i∈A
vi(Ati−Ât+1,i),
where vi is the value of asset i ∈ A. We rewrite the cost function in terms of
only the current state and decision by taking its expected value
C(St, xt) = E
{∑
i∈A
vi(Ati − Ât+1,i)|St, xt
}
.
We seek the policy that minimizes our expected total cost savings. That is,
we are trying to maintain as much value as possible in the assets. This optimal
policy is denoted as π∗, and our objective is denoted as
min
π∈Π
Eπ
{
T∑
t=0
γtC(St, X
π
t (St))
}
.
The notation Eπ shows that the expectation is dependent upon the defender’s
actions.
The parameter γ ∈ (0, 1) is a discount factor that implicitly models the
number of salvos or decision epochs T . We note the following relationship
E[T ] =
1
1− γ
. (1)
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The defender does not know how many salvos they need to defend against which
makes this case more difficult than a simple optimization problem. The infinite
time horizon requires the defender to make optimal decisions in the face of an
uncertain number of incoming salvos of TBMs. To determine the optimal policy,
we must find a solution to the Bellman equation
J(St) = min
xt∈XSt
(C(St, xt) + γE{J(St+1)|St, xt}). (2)
6. We define the decision function (i.e., policy) as
Xπ(St) = arg min
xt∈XSt
(C(St, xt) + γE{J(St+1)|St, xt}),
where π represents a policy.
ADP Formulation
Although this MDP model enables the determination of an exact solution to
the DWTAP, it is only computationally tractable for very small problems. In any
instance of interest to the air defense community, the problem quickly becomes too
large to solve optimally. For example, if we look at the size of the state space S,
where St = (At, Rt, M̂t) ∈ S is an arbitrary state. The tuples At, Rt, and M̂t
represent the status of each asset, the status of each SAM battery’s inventory, and
the attacker TBMs at decision epoch t, respectively. Since asset status can be from
0, .25, . . . , 1 there are 5|A| possibilities for At. The different SAM sites have different
max inventories, but if they each had a max of 12 interceptors then there are 13|R|
possibilities for Rt. If M is the maximum number of attacker missiles that can be
located in any SAM’s area of responsibility at any epoch t, then there are
(|A|+M
M
)
possibilities for M̂t. This means that an instance of this problem with three SAM sites,
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a max of 12 interceptors per site, and 12 points where missiles can be located creates
a state space of nearly one billion different states. Exhaustive enumeration of a state
space this size is computationally intractable to find the exact solution. Additionally,
the DWTAP air defense problem suffers from the curse of diminsionality in reference
to the action space as well as the state space. Since the defender can choose to fire
zero or up to two interceptors at every TBM in the corresponding SAM site’s area of
responsibility, the feasible actions can increase into the millions with only 14 available
firing points. Such a large action space makes solving this problem to the optimal
solution computationally intractable even if the state space did not.
ADP offers solution strategies to handle both of the issues described in the previ-
ous paragraph. The approximate policy iteration (API) algorithmic strategy approx-
imates solutions utilizing Equation (2). Therefore we rewrite the Bellman equation
and use the post-decision state variable convention. Letting Jx(Sxt ) be the value
of being in post-decision state Sxt , we can show the relationship between J(St) and
Jx(Sxt ) with the following equations
Jx(Sxt−1) = E{J(St)|Sxt−1}, (3)
J(St) = min
xt∈XSt
(C(St, xt) + γJ
x(Sxt )), (4)
Jx(Sxt ) = E{J(St+1)|Sxt }
By substituting Equation (4) into Equation (3), we obtain the Bellman equation
around the post-decision state variable
Jx(Sxt−1) = E
{
min
xt∈XSt
(C(St, xt) + γJ
x(Sxt ))
∣∣∣Sxt−1}.
Using the post-decision state form instead of the standard form of the Bellman equa-
tion requires the swapping of the expectation and minimum operators and allows
us to avoid approximating the expectation inside of the optimization problem. This
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allows us to control the structure and take advantage of approximation techniques.
With ADP we will step forward in time and solve the problem stochastically
instead of enumerating the entire state space and using techniques like backward
induction to solve the problem exactly. We are able to randomly choose a pre-decision
state St and make a decision xt to move to the post-decision state S
x
t .
We can now handle large state spaces, but we still must contend with approxi-
mating the expectation. We can do this by constructing a post-decision state variable
which allows us to avoid this approximation. Van Roy et al. [24] first used this term,
and Powell and Van Roy [21] define the post-decision state variable as the state at
time t which is right after a decision xt is made, but before any new information Ŵt+1
arrives. Now the state transition function St+1 = S
M(St, xt,Wt+1) can be broken into
two steps
Sxt = S
M,x(St, xt),
and
St+1 = S
M,W (Sxt ,Wt+1),
where Sxt is the post-decision state variable. For this DWTAP air defense problem, the
post-decision state is given by Sxt = (A
x
t , R
x
t ), where A
x
t = (A
x
ti)i∈A is the component
concerning asset status and Rxt = (R
x
ti)i∈A is the component concerning interceptor
inventory status.
Value Function Approximation
The value function is approximated using regression methods. Similar to linear
regression where we seek to find a vector using observations to fit a model that
will predict a new unknown observation using a set of variables, for value function
approximation we seek to find a parameter vector θ using observations that are created
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from a set of basis functions (φf (St))f∈F . The set F of basis functions reduces the size
of the state variable to those factors that we are most concerned with. For example,
a basis function f ∈ F for our problem might be the remaining value of a defended
asset. Using the post-decision state, we write our value function in a similar way from
linear regression
J̄x(Sxt ) =
∑
f∈F
θfφf (S
x
t ). (5)
Our Bellman equation is then expressed as follows
J̄x(Sxt−1) = E
{
min
xt∈XSt
(C(St, xt) + γ
∑
f∈F
θfφf (S
x
t ))
∣∣∣Sxt−1
}
.
Algorithmic Strategy
API uses a series of inner loops to evaluate a set policy. It then uses an outer
loop to improve the policy. For least squares temporal difference (LSTD), this is
done by updating the θ vector after each inner loop completes and using the updated
θ vector to better approximate the value function in the next outer loop iteration.
Each time the algorithm finishes an inner loop it updates the θ vector and performs
another iteration of the outer loop to seek further improvement. Algorithm 1 shows
API-LSTD modified to solve the air defense problem.
The algorithm consists of K policy evaluation loops and N policy improvement
loops. After initializing a θ vector as the representation of a base policy, the policy
evaluation loop begins by generating a random post-decision state. Once the value
φ(Sxt−1,k) is recorded, we simulate forward to the next pre-decision state and select
the best decision using exhaustive enumeration. We could also use a genetic algo-
rithm to increase time savings, but exhaustive enumeration allows us to investigate
a wider range of basis functions. We record the cost C(St,k, xt) and basis function
22
evaluations of the post-decision state, φ(Sxt,k). We obtain K temporal difference sam-
ple realizations where the kth temporal difference given the parameter vector θn is
(C(St,k, xt) + γφ(S
x
t,k)
T θn)− φ(Sxt,k−1)T θn.
The policy improvement loop occurs once the Kth temporal difference sample re-
alizations is collected. We can describe the basis function vectors and the cost vector
in the following manner. Let
Φt−1 ,

φ(Sxt−1,1)
>
...
φ(Sxt−1,K)
>
 , Φt ,

φ(Sxt,1)
>
...
φ(Sxt,K)
>
 , Ct ,

C(St,1)
...
C(St,K)
 ,
where matrices Φt−1 and Φt contain rows of basis function evaluations of the sampled
post-decision states, and Ct is the cost vector. We perform a least squares regression
of Φt−1 and Φt against Ct to ensure the sum of the K temporal differences equals zero
and calculate θ̂. We update our estimate of θ using αn =
a
a+n−1 , a ∈ (0,∞) as our
smoothing function. The smoothing function manages the rate at which the function
converges. Higher values of a slow the rate that αn drops to zero, which allows later
N loop iterations to have more impact on the θ vector. Smoothing θ completes one
policy improvement step.
For least squares policy evaluation (LSPE), we obtain a collection of M value
and post-decision state pairs and use least squares regression to fit a linear model to
approximate our a value function. This is done by updating the θ vector after each
inner loop completes and using the updated θ vector to better approximate the value
function in the next outer loop iteration. Each time the algorithm finishes an inner
loop it updates the θ vector and performs another iteration of the outer loop to seek
further improvement. Algorithm 2 shows API-LSPE modified to solve the air defense
problem.
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Algorithm 1 LSTD-API Algorithm [19]
1: Step 0: Initialize θ0.
2: Step 1:
3: for n=1 to N (Policy Improvement Loop)
4: Step 2:
5: for m=1 to M (Policy Evaluation Loop)
6: Generate a random post-decision state, Sxt−1,m.
7: Record φ(Sxt−1,m).
8: Simulate transition to next pre-decision state, St,m.
9: Determine decision x = Xπ(St,m|θn−1) through exhaustive enumeration of
feasible actions.
10: Record cost C(St,m, x).
11: Record basis function evaluation φ(Sxt,m)
12: end for
13: End
14: Update θn and the policy:
15: θ̂ = [(Φt−1 − γΦt)T (Φt−1 − γΦt)]−1(Φt−1 − γΦt)TCt
16: θn = αnθ̂ + (1− αn)θn−1
17: end for
18: Return Xπ(St|θN) and θN .
19: End
The algorithm consists of K policy evaluation loops and N policy improvement
loops. After initializing a θ vector as the representation of a base policy, the policy
evaluation loop begins by generating a random post-decision state. Once the value
φ(Sxt−1,k) is recorded, we simulate forward to the next pre-decision state and select
the best decision using exhaustive enumeration. We record the value V (St,k, xt) and
basis function evaluations of the post-decision state, φ(Sxt,k).
The policy improvement loop occurs once the Kth policy evaluation sample real-
izations is collected. We can describe the basis function vectors and the cost vector
in the following manner. Let
Φt−1 ,

φ(Sxt−1,1)
>
...
φ(Sxt−1,K)
>
 , Vt ,

V (St,1)
...
V (St,K)
 ,
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where matrix Φt−1 contains rows of basis function evaluations of the sampled post-
decision states, and Vt is the value vector. We perform a least squares regression of
Φt−1 against Vt. We update our estimate of θ using αn =
a
a+n−1 , a ∈ (0,∞) as our
smoothing function. Smoothing θ completes one policy improvement step.
Algorithm 2 LSPE-API Algorithm [19]
1: Step 0: Initialize θ0.
2: Step 1:
3: for n=1 to N (Policy Improvement Loop)
4: Step 2:
5: for m=1 to M (Policy Evaluation Loop)
6: Generate a random post-decision state, Sxt−1,m.
7: Record φ(Sxt−1,m).
8: Simulate transition to next pre-decision state, St,m.
9: Determine decision x = Xπ(St,m|θn−1) through exhaustive enumeration of
feasible actions.
10: Record cost V (St,m, x).
11: end for
12: End
13: Update θn and the policy:
14: θ̂ = [(Φt−1)
T (Φt−1)]
−1(Φt−1)
TVt
15: θn = αnθ̂ + (1− αn)θn−1
16: end for
17: Return Xπ(St|θN) and θN .
18: End
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IV. Results
4.1 Computational Results
In this chapter, we examine a problem of interest to the military and utilize the
approximate dynamic programming (APD) techniques described in Chapter 3 to seek
policy solutions to this problem. We compare policies found by our ADP algorithms
to current baseline policies used by the air defense community. We construct a theater
ballistic missile (TBM) defense scenario as the tactical underpinning for our analysis.
From this scenario, we create 32 test instances and, for each instance, determine
approximate solutions for each baseline policy using simulation techniques. We solve
each instance approximately by employing the ADP solution methodologies. A set
of designed experiments is conducted to identify which ADP algorithmic parameter-
values result in the best solution. We conduct computational experiments for both
least squares policy evaluation (LSPE) and least squares temporal difference (LSTD),
and compare the two ADP algorithms to each other to determine the best overall ADP
algorithm (and policy) for each of the 32 instances. We also compare the current air
defense policies and the acquired ADP policies using vignettes that are of interest
from earlier simulation-based experiments.
Representative Scenario.
We present a networked TBM defense utilizing the Missile Defense Agency’s
(MDA) defense-in-depth plan for a mid-course and terminal phase defense. For this
scenario the defender seeks to protect two assets. This scenario places an Aegis air
defense system at the mid-course point, a THAAD with the first defended asset, and
a Patriot with the second defended asset. See Figure 1 for a detailed diagram of this
scenario. All TBMs pass through the Aegis’ area of responsibility, and the Aegis has
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an opportunity to fire up to two interceptors at each TBM. We allocate 12 intercep-
tors to the Aegis, which constitutes half of the payload of the Aegis equipped ship
[1]. The THAAD and the Patriot can only fire at TBMs targeting their defended
asset, but they also have the opportunity to fire up to two interceptors at each TBM.
The attacker fires a combination of traditional TBMs and multiple reentry vehicle
(MeRV) TBMs. If the MeRV is missed (or not targeted) by the Aegis, it splits into
three missiles (targets) before the THAAD or Patriot have an opportunity to fire at it.
The TBMs, if missed or not fired at in the terminal phase, have a given probability of
hitting its intended target. This probability of hit models the technical sophistication
of the attacker’s weaponry (e.g., flight control, guidance, and warhead technology).
If the TBM hits its targeted defended asset, it decrements the asset by a preassigned
amount of one quarter of the asset’s total value. The defended asset can sustain up
to four hits before being completely destroyed. A discount factor is used to model
how many expected salvos the defender will encounter. See Davis et al. (2016) for a
description of this modeling approach.
Attacker
Mid-Course
Phase
Terminal
Phase
Aegis AOR
THAAD AOR Patriot AOR
Attacker 
TBM Course
Defender 
Mid-course
Defender 
Terminal
Defender
Figure 1. Scenario Diagram
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From this basic scenario, we develop 32 test instances by varying four of the
problem features. We first varied the number of salvos the defender can expect to
engage, or the duration of the attack, as indicated by γ. Exploratory simulations,
based on the number of available interceptors in each phase, allowed us to choose two
γ-values, 0.8 and 0.9, to investigate the impact the expected number of salvos had on
the ADP policy.
The second problem feature we varied was the enemy’s level of technological so-
phistication – that is, the enemy may have fairly accurate TBMs or inaccurate TBMs.
We chose a probability of hit of 0.8 for the technologically superior attacker and a
probability of hit of 0.5 for the technologically inferior attacker.
The third problem feature we varied was the defender’s level of technological
sophistication, seeking to capture the accuracy of the defender’s interceptors to suc-
cessfully engage the TBMs. We chose a probability of kill for the technologically
superior defender of 0.8, 0.9, and 0.85 for the Aegis, THAAD and Patriot, respec-
tively. We chose a probability of kill for the technologically inferior defender of 0.7,
0.8, and 0.75, for the Aegis, THAAD, and Patriot respectively.
The fourth problem feature we varied was the defended asset value. We wanted
to investigate how a higher, lower, or equal value of the defended assets protected by
the THAAD and Patriot would affect the ADP policy. We assigned equal values of
24 for both Asset 1 and Asset 2 for the Low/Low case, values of 48 for Asset 1 and 24
for Asset 2 for the High/Low case, values of 24 for Asset 1 and 48 for Asset 2 in the
Low/High case, and equal values of 48 for both Asset 1 and Asset 2 in the High/High
case. Table 1 shows the problem feature settings for each test instance.
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Table 1. Test Instances
Problem Features
Expected Conflict
Duration
Attacker’s Technological
Sophistication
Defender’s Technological
Sophistication
Defended Asset
Values
1 Short (E[T ] = 5) Low (pH = 0.5) Medium (pK = 0.7, 0.8, 0.75) Low/Low
2 Short (E[T ] = 5) Low (pH = 0.5) Medium (pK = 0.7, 0.8, 0.75) High/Low
3 Short (E[T ] = 5) Low (pH = 0.5) Medium (pK = 0.7, 0.8, 0.75) Low/High
4 Short (E[T ] = 5) Low (pH = 0.5) Medium (pK = 0.7, 0.8, 0.75) High/High
5 Short (E[T ] = 5) Low (pH = 0.5) High (pK = 0.8, 0.9, 0.85) Low/Low
6 Short (E[T ] = 5) Low (pH = 0.5) High (pK = 0.8, 0.9, 0.85) High/Low
7 Short (E[T ] = 5) Low (pH = 0.5) High (pK = 0.8, 0.9, 0.85) Low/High
8 Short (E[T ] = 5) Low (pH = 0.5) High (pK = 0.8, 0.9, 0.85) High/High
9 Short (E[T ] = 5) High (pH = 0.8) Medium (pK = 0.7, 0.8, 0.75) Low/Low
10 Short (E[T ] = 5) High (pH = 0.8) Medium (pK = 0.7, 0.8, 0.75) High/Low
11 Short (E[T ] = 5) High (pH = 0.8) Medium (pK = 0.7, 0.8, 0.75) Low/High
12 Short (E[T ] = 5) High (pH = 0.8) Medium (pK = 0.7, 0.8, 0.75) High/High
13 Short (E[T ] = 5) High (pH = 0.8) High (pK = 0.8, 0.9, 0.85) Low/Low
14 Short (E[T ] = 5) High (pH = 0.8) High (pK = 0.8, 0.9, 0.85) High/Low
15 Short (E[T ] = 5) High (pH = 0.8) High (pK = 0.8, 0.9, 0.85) Low/High
16 Short (E[T ] = 5) High (pH = 0.8) High (pK = 0.8, 0.9, 0.85) High/High
17 Long (E[T ] = 10) Low (pH = 0.5) Medium (pK =0.7, 0.8, 0.75) Low/Low
18 Long (E[T ] = 10) Low (pH = 0.5) Medium (pK =0.7, 0.8, 0.75) High/Low
19 Long (E[T ] = 10) Low (pH = 0.5) Medium (pK =0.7, 0.8, 0.75) Low/High
20 Long (E[T ] = 10) Low (pH = 0.5) Medium (pK = 0.7, 0.8, 0.75) High/High
21 Long (E[T ] = 10) Low (pH = 0.5) High (pK = 0.8, 0.9, 0.85) Low/Low
22 Long (E[T ] = 10) Low (pH = 0.5) High (pK = 0.8, 0.9, 0.85) High/Low
23 Long (E[T ] = 10) Low (pH = 0.5) High (pK = 0.8, 0.9, 0.85) Low/High
24 Long (E[T ] = 10) Low (pH = 0.5) High (pK = 0.8, 0.9, 0.85) High/High
25 Long (E[T ] = 10) High (pH = 0.8) Medium (pK = 0.7, 0.8, 0.75) Low/Low
26 Long (E[T ] = 10) High (pH = 0.8) Medium (pK = 0.7, 0.8, 0.75) High/Low
27 Long (E[T ] = 10) High (pH = 0.8) Medium (pK = 0.7, 0.8, 0.75) Low/High
28 Long (E[T ] = 10) High (pH = 0.8) Medium (pK = 0.7, 0.8, 0.75) High/High
29 Long (E[T ] = 10) High (pH = 0.8) High (pK = 0.8, 0.9, 0.85) Low/Low
30 Long (E[T ] = 10) High (pH = 0.8) High (pK = 0.8, 0.9, 0.85) High/Low
31 Long (E[T ] = 10) High (pH = 0.8) High (pK = 0.8, 0.9, 0.85) Low/High
32 Long (E[T ] = 10) High (pH = 0.8) High (pK = 0.8, 0.9, 0.85) High/High
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Experimental Design.
For each of the 32 test instances, we wish to determine the best parameter settings
for Algorithms 1 and 2. We focus on parameters N,K, φ, a, and η. Table 2 shows
the 2-level, 5-factor experimental design, and Table 3 shows the set of features for
each design level of the φ factor. The levels for each factor were chosen based on
initial experimental runs of the model. These experimental runs also suggested that
the instrumental variables (IV) method for LSTD would not perform well for these
instances, and so the IV method was not utilized.
Experimental Results.
For each test instance, we ran a full factorial experiment for three random number
seeds (i.e., three replications) for a total of 96 runs. For each run, we recorded the
mean and standard deviation, and calculated the difference between the ADP policy
means and the means garnered from our two baseline policies. For each scenario, we
chose the ADP policy (and noted the attendant parameter settings) that provided
the largest difference between the baseline policies and the ADP policy.
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Table 2. Experimental Design for Algorithmic Features
N K φ a η
25 1000 1 10 10
50 1000 1 10 10
25 2000 1 10 10
50 2000 1 10 10
25 1000 2 10 10
50 1000 2 10 10
25 2000 2 10 10
50 2000 2 10 10
25 1000 1 100 10
50 1000 1 100 10
25 2000 1 100 10
50 2000 1 100 10
25 1000 2 100 10
50 1000 2 100 10
25 2000 2 100 10
50 2000 2 100 10
25 1000 1 10 100
50 1000 1 10 100
25 2000 1 10 100
50 2000 1 10 100
25 1000 2 10 100
50 1000 2 10 100
25 2000 2 10 100
50 2000 2 10 100
25 1000 1 100 100
50 1000 1 100 100
25 2000 1 100 100
50 2000 1 100 100
25 1000 2 100 100
50 1000 2 100 100
25 2000 2 100 100
50 2000 2 100 100
Table 3. Basis Function Features
φ φ0(S) φ1(S) φ2(S) φ3(S) φ4(S) φ5(S)
1 1 At R
x
t A
x
t
2 1 Rxt A
x
t (R
x
t )
2 (Axt )
2 RxtA
x
t
31
4.2 Least Squares Policy Evaluation
Using the problem features and experimental design described in Section 4.1, we
implemented the LSPE algorithm annotated in Algorithm 2. This required 3072 runs
to perform the full factorial experiment for all problem and algorithmic features with
three replications. The LSPE ADP algorithm provided a θ-vector for each of these
3072 runs. We then utilized a simulation to determine the mean performance and
standard deviation for each of those 3072 θ-vectors. We executed 2000 simulation
runs for each θ-vector in order to gain confidence that we found an accurate mean.
We compared the ADP results to the two baseline policies. The first baseline
policy (Baseline Policy 1) was to fire one interceptor at each incoming TBM (as long
as the SAM site inventory allowed), and the second baseline policy (Baseline Policy
2)was to fire two interceptors at each TBM (if the SAM site inventory did not allow
for firing two, only then would the SAM fire one). We executed 2000 simulation
runs for the two baseline policies. In exploratory runs of the simulation, we found
that firing one interceptor at each incoming TBM generally outperformed firing two
interceptors for the problem features being explored. We compared the means of the
policies found by our LSPE algorithms to the two baseline policies. The results for
the best ADP policy versus the baseline polices for each scenario are shown in Table
4.
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Table 4. LSPE Results - Quality of Solution Using Best θ-vector
Instance (γ, pH, pK, Asset Value) Best Algorithm Parameters (N,k,a,η, φ) ADP Policy 95% CI Baseline Policy 1 95% CI Baseline Policy 2 95% CI
1 (0.8, 0.5, 1, Low/Low) 25, 2000, 100, 1, 2 † † 5.75± 0.71 7.55± 0.64 7.59± 0.82
2 (0.8, 0.5, 1, High/Low) 25, 1000, 10, 10, 2 † † 5.68± 0.71 8.01± 0.68 7.97± 0.85
3 (0.8, 0.5, 1, Low/High) 25, 2000, 100, 10, 1 6.09± 0.73 7.42± 0.63 6.77± 0.78
4 (0.8, 0.5, 1, High/High) 25, 2000, 10, 1, 2 6.05± 0.72 7.55± 0.63 7.2± 0.8
5 (0.8, 0.5, 1, Low/Low) 25, 2000, 100, 1, 2 4.78± 0.67 4.29± 0.52 7.25± 0.84
6 (0.8, 0.5, 2, High/Low) 50, 2000, 100, 10, 2 4.71± 0.68 4.43± 0.51 7.41± 0.84
7 (0.8, 0.5, 2, Low/High) 25, 1000, 100, 1, 2 4.99± 0.7 4.13± 0.46 6.48± 0.78
8 (0.8, 0.5, 2, High/High) 50, 1000, 10, 10, 2 5.15± 0.71 4.18± 0.5 6.42± 0.78
9 (0.8, 0.8, 2, Low/Low) 50, 2000, 10, 1, 1 †7.11± 0.8 11.68± 0.84 8.53± 0.88
10 (0.8, 0.8, 1, High/Low) 25, 1000, 10, 1, 2 †7.68± 0.83 10.39± 0.77 9.15± 0.91
11 (0.8, 0.8, 1, Low/High) 50, 2000, 100, 10, 1 7.49± 0.81 10.8± 0.78 8.33± 0.85
12 (0.8, 0.8, 1, High/High) 25, 2000, 100, 1, 1 † † 7.37± 0.81 10.82± 0.79 9.36± 0.92
13 (0.8, 0.8, 2, Low/Low) 25, 2000, 10, 10, 2 6.07± 0.77 5.79± 0.58 7.98± 0.89
14 (0.8, 0.8, 2, High/Low) 50, 2000, 10, 10, 2 6.12± 0.79 5.69± 0.58 6.68± 0.81
15 (0.8, 0.8, 2, Low/High) 25, 1000, 10, 10, 1 5.97± 0.78 5.94± 0.6 8.65± 0.91
16 (0.8, 0.8, 2, High/High) 50, 2000, 100, 10, 2 6.02± 0.76 6.25± 0.62 7.31± 0.84
17 (0.9, 0.5, 1, Low/Low) 25, 1000, 100, 10, 1 21.11± 1.3 20.88± 1.13 24.46± 1.35
18 (0.9, 0.5, 1, High/Low) 25, 1000, 100, 10, 1 21.02± 1.29 19.9± 1.12 22.58± 1.32
19 (0.9, 0.5, 1, Low/High) 50, 1000, 100, 10, 2 20.27± 1.29 20.17± 1.12 23.6± 1.34
20 (0.9, 0.5, 1, High/High) 25, 2000, 100, 10, 1 21.16± 1.3 21.49± 1.15 23.4± 1.32
21 (0.9, 0.5, 1, Low/Low) 25, 1000, 100, 1, 2 19.46± 1.29 ? ? 15.22± 1.06 22.46± 1.34
22 (0.9, 0.5, 2, High/Low) 50, 2000, 10, 1, 1 19.55± 1.29 ? ? 14.33± 1.02 22.46± 1.35
23 (0.9, 0.5, 2, Low/High) 25, 2000, 10, 10, 2 19.6± 1.29 ? ? 14.44± 1.04 21.47± 1.31
24 (0.9, 0.5, 2, High/High) 25, 1000, 10, 1, 1 19.53± 1.28 ? ? 14.5± 1.03 21.6± 1.33
25 (0.9, 0.8, 2, Low/Low) 50, 1000, 10, 1, 2 †22.97± 1.34 25.83± 1.2 25.66± 1.38
26 (0.9, 0.8, 1, High/Low) 50, 1000, 100, 1, 1 †23.34± 1.35 26.98± 1.24 25.94± 1.38
27 (0.9, 0.8, 1, Low/High) 25, 2000, 100, 1, 1 †22.85± 1.34 25.16± 1.21 25.91± 1.38
28 (0.9, 0.8, 1, High/High) 50, 1000, 10, 1, 1 23.15± 1.33 25.76± 1.21 25± 1.37
29 (0.9, 0.8, 2, Low/Low) 25, 1000, 100, 10, 1 21.38± 1.34 ? ? 17.95± 1.11 24.19± 1.39
30 (0.9, 0.8, 2, High/Low) 50, 1000, 10, 10, 2 21.12± 1.32 19.64± 1.15 23.83± 1.38
31 (0.9, 0.8, 2, Low/High) 25, 1000, 10, 1, 2 20.88± 1.34 ? ? 18.01± 1.12 24.53± 1.4
32 (0.9, 0.8, 2, High/High) 50, 2000, 10, 1, 1 21.12± 1.34 19.42± 1.17 22.74± 1.36
†† denotes statistical significance (as compared to the next best policy) with 95% confidence
† denotes statistical significance (as compared to the next best policy) with 90% confidence
?? denotes statistical significance (as compared to the ADP policy) with 95% confidence
? denotes statistical significance (as compared to the ADP policy) with 90% confidence
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The LSPE policy achieves statistically significant improvement over the two base-
line policies in 8 of the 32 test instances. The instances that show LSPE policy
superiority at the 95% confidence level are 1, 2, and 12. Instances 9, 10, 25, 26, and
27 show statistical significance at the 90% confidence level. LSPE attains the best
mean result in 14 of the 32 instances. We see that LSPE outperforms the baseline
policies when the duration of the conflict is short or when the enemy has weapons
with a high probability of hit. It is not surprising that in circumstances where if
missed the incoming TBM has a high likelihood of damaging its targeted asset that
the LSPE policy outperforms the baseline policies, but it is interesting that in shorter
duration conflicts when the two baseline policies show very similar means that the
ADP is able to outperform at a statistically significant level.
Baseline Policy 1 outperforms LSPE in Instances 21, 22, 23, 24, 29, and 31 at the
95% confidence level. Examining these instances, we find common characteristics:
long duration conflict where the attacker had lower quality weapons and the defender
had higher quality weapons.
It is of further interest that Baseline Policy 2, which is currently the Army’s
implemented policy, is never significantly better than the LSPE policy or Baseline
Policy 1. This suggests that as the military moves to an integrated, defense-in-depth
strategy it needs to consider a different firing policy for networked air defense systems
with both mid-course and terminal systems.
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Figure 2. Cost Difference between High and Low Attacker Weapon Quality
Figure 2 highlights the cost difference between LSPE and Baseline Policy 1 when
we look at the two different levels of attacker weapon quality for short and long
duration conflicts. In this we observe that for high quality attacker weapons LSPE
performs better than the baseline policy regardless of conflict duration, but for low
quality attacker weapons Baseline Policy 1 is superior for long duration conflicts.
Note that this graphic implies a linear relationship that might not exist.
Figure 3. Cost Difference between High and Medium Defender Weapon Quality
Figure 3 highlights the cost difference between LSPE and Baseline Policy 1 when
we look at the two different levels of defender weapon quality for short and long
duration conflicts. In this we observe that for medium quality defender weapons
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LSPE performs better than the baseline policy regardless of conflict duration, but for
high quality defender weapons Baseline Policy 1 is always superior. Note that this
graphic implies a linear relationship that might not exist.
Table 5. LSPE Results - Robustness
Algorithm Parameters Run 1 Run 2 Run 3 Mean Best Difference
1 25, 2000, 100, 1, 2 5.75 6.62 6.23 6.20 5.75 0.45
2 25, 1000, 10, 10, 2 7.00 5.68 6.81 6.50 5.68 0.82
3 25, 2000, 100, 10, 1 6.09 6.52 6.27 6.29 6.09 0.20
4 25, 2000, 10, 1, 2 6.05 6.52 6.93 6.50 6.05 0.45
5 25, 2000, 100, 1, 2 5.69 4.78 6.03 5.50 4.78 0.72
6 50, 2000, 100, 10, 2 4.71 5.60 6.14 5.49 4.71 0.77
7 25, 1000, 100, 1, 2 6.04 4.99 5.85 5.63 4.99 0.64
8 50, 1000, 10, 10, 2 5.15 5.94 5.72 5.60 5.15 0.45
9 50, 2000, 10, 1, 1 8.27 9.43 7.11 8.27 7.11 1.16
10 25, 1000, 10, 1, 2 7.68 8.43 8.37 8.16 7.68 0.48
11 50, 2000, 100, 10, 1 8.59 7.49 8.33 8.13 7.49 0.65
12 25, 2000, 100, 1, 1 7.37 8.21 8.50 8.03 7.37 0.66
13 25, 2000, 10, 10, 2 6.07 7.07 7.47 6.87 6.07 0.80
14 50, 2000, 10, 10, 2 6.95 7.15 6.12 6.74 6.12 0.62
15 25, 1000, 10, 10, 1 7.00 5.97 7.35 6.77 5.97 0.80
16 50, 2000, 100, 10, 2 6.02 7.05 6.86 6.65 6.02 0.62
17 25, 1000, 100, 10, 1 22.46 21.11 22.85 22.14 21.11 1.03
18 25, 1000, 100, 10, 1 21.02 22.30 21.47 21.60 21.02 0.58
19 50, 1000, 100, 10, 2 21.77 20.27 22.24 21.42 20.27 1.15
20 25, 2000, 100, 10, 1 22.06 22.92 21.16 22.05 21.16 0.89
21 25, 1000, 100, 1, 2 20.90 21.27 19.46 20.54 19.46 1.09
22 50, 2000, 10, 1, 1 21.00 19.55 21.10 20.55 19.55 1.00
23 25, 2000, 10, 10, 2 19.60 21.19 20.17 20.32 19.6 0.72
24 25, 1000, 10, 1, 1 21.74 21.44 19.53 20.90 19.53 1.37
25 50, 1000, 10, 1, 2 23.56 25.45 22.97 23.99 22.97 1.02
26 50, 1000, 100, 1, 1 23.34 24.44 25.11 24.30 23.34 0.96
27 25, 2000, 100, 1, 1 25.92 22.85 25.10 24.62 22.85 1.78
28 50, 1000, 10, 1, 1 24.80 24.97 23.15 24.31 23.15 1.16
29 25, 1000, 100, 10, 1 21.38 22.06 23.68 22.37 21.38 0.99
30 50, 1000, 10, 10, 2 22.16 21.12 24.05 22.45 21.12 1.33
31 25, 1000, 10, 1, 2 23.06 20.88 22.07 22.00 20.88 1.12
32 50, 2000, 10, 1, 1 23.62 24.48 21.12 23.07 21.12 1.95
Table 5 shows the LSPE-determined three-run averages for the θ-vectors for each
replication of the 32 instances. These three-run averages show a general robustness
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across the θ-vectors garnered from the given parameter settings. For most of the
instances, we have a less than 1 point difference between the best mean and the aver-
age mean. Though this would impact the statistical significance of those parameter
settings versus the baseline policies, it does not indicate that any of the chosen best
θ-vectors were simply outliers. This result suggests an overall robustness with respect
to the consistency of performance of the LSPE algorithm.
Meta Analysis
Table 6. Parameter Estimates - LSPE
Estimate Standard Error t Ratio Probability < |t|
Intercept -120.26 0.22 -555.56 < 0.0001
N (outer loops) 0.00 0.00 -0.79 0.43
K (inner loops) 0.00 0.00 1.47 0.14
a (smoothing) 0.00 0.00 -2.05 0.04
η (regularization) 0.00 0.00 0.61 0.54
φ (basis function set) -0.01 0.02 -0.34 0.73
Conflict Duration 157.27 0.23 694.73 < 0.0001
Attacker Weapon Quality 5.74 0.08 76.05 < 0.0001
Defender Weapon Quality -1.44 0.02 -63.43 < 0.0001
Asset 1 Value 0.00 0.00 -1.61 0.11
Asset 2 Value 0.00 0.00 -0.37 0.71
R-Square Adj 0.99
When examining the parameter estimates in Table 6, we see that conflict duration,
attacker weapon quality, and defender weapon quality have the largest impact on the
change in the mean of the damage caused by the incoming TBMs. Although not
statistically significant at a 95% confidence level, the Asset 1 value factor appears to
explain more of the variation than the N, η, φ and the Asset 2 value factors. Recall
that Asset 1 is protected by the THAAD air defense system and the THAAD had
the highest pK across all scenarios. This suggests that having the more effective air
defense system co-located with the higher value asset could lead to more impact in
minimizing the mean damage incurred, an intuitive result.
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Examining the parameter settings for the ADP algorithm, we observe that the
smoothing component explains a significant portion of the variation (with a 0.04 p-
value). Although the number of inner loops (K) is not statistically significant, it does
explain more variation than the other parameter settings. It is likely that the number
of outer loops (N) did not have more impact on the mean because the smoothing
coefficient did have an impact, and new information garnered from a higher number
of outer loops received very little weight. We likely did not have a large enough
difference in the number of inner loops, and had we had time to perform 4000 inner
loops, we might have seen this coefficient become statistically significant. Since the
φ did not have an impact we might benefit from searching for other sets of basis
functions that perform better than the baseline policies.
4.3 Least Squares Temporal Difference
Using the problem features and experimental design described in Section 4.1 we
implemented the LSTD algorithm annotated in Algorithm 1. This required 3072 runs
to perform the full factorial experiment of all problem and algorithmic features with
three replications. The LSTD ADP algorithm provided a θ-vector for each of these
3072 runs. We then utilized a simulation to determine the performance in terms of
the mean and standard deviation for each of those 3072 θ-vectors. We executed 2000
simulation runs to ensure we had confidence in our garnered mean.
We compared these means to the means for the two baseline policies. We compared
the means of our LSTD algorithms to the two baseline policies. These results for the
best θ-vector versus the baseline for each scenario is shown on Table 7.
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Table 7. LSTD Results - Quality of Solution Using Best θ-vector
Instance (γ, pH, pK, Asset Value) Best Algorithm Parameters (N,k,a,η, φ) ADP Policy 95% CI Baseline Policy 1 95% CI Baseline Policy 2 95% CI
1 (0.8, 0.5, 1, Low/Low) 25, 2000, 10, 10, 2 †6.08± 0.74 7.55± 0.64 7.59± 0.82
2 (0.8, 0.5, 1, High/Low) 25, 2000, 10, 1, 2 † † 6.15± 0.73 8.01± 0.68 7.97± 0.85
3 (0.8, 0.5, 1, Low/High) 25, 2000, 100, 1, 2 6.17± 0.74 7.42± 0.63 6.77± 0.78
4 (0.8, 0.5, 1, High/High) 25, 2000, 100, 10, 2 6.05± 0.73 7.55± 0.63 7.2± 0.8
5 (0.8, 0.5, 1, Low/Low) 25, 1000, 10, 10, 2 4.83± 0.68 4.29± 0.52 7.25± 0.84
6 (0.8, 0.5, 2, High/Low) 50, 2000, 10, 10, 2 4.55± 0.66 4.43± 0.51 7.41± 0.84
7 (0.8, 0.5, 2, Low/High) 50, 1000, 100, 10, 1 4.9± 0.68 4.13± 0.46 6.48± 0.78
8 (0.8, 0.5, 2, High/High) 50, 2000, 100, 10, 2 4.88± 0.7 4.18± 0.5 6.42± 0.78
9 (0.8, 0.8, 2, Low/Low) 25, 1000, 100, 10, 2 7.29± 0.81 11.68± 0.84 8.53± 0.88
10 (0.8, 0.8, 1, High/Low) 50, 1000, 10, 1, 2 † † 7.16± 0.79 10.39± 0.77 9.15± 0.91
11 (0.8, 0.8, 1, Low/High) 50, 2000, 100, 10, 1 7.58± 0.83 10.8± 0.78 8.33± 0.85
12 (0.8, 0.8, 1, High/High) 25, 2000, 10, 10, 1 † † 7.31± 0.8 10.82± 0.79 9.36± 0.92
13 (0.8, 0.8, 2, Low/Low) 25, 1000, 100, 10, 1 6.23± 0.79 5.79± 0.58 7.98± 0.89
14 (0.8, 0.8, 2, High/Low) 25, 1000, 10, 1, 1 6.3± 0.79 5.69± 0.58 6.68± 0.81
15 (0.8, 0.8, 2, Low/High) 25, 2000, 10, 10, 2 5.98± 0.77 5.94± 0.6 8.65± 0.91
16 (0.8, 0.8, 2, High/High) 25, 1000, 10, 10, 1 6.14± 0.79 6.25± 0.62 7.31± 0.84
17 (0.9, 0.5, 1, Low/Low) 25, 1000, 100, 1, 2 20.69± 1.29 20.88± 1.13 24.46± 1.35
18 (0.9, 0.5, 1, High/Low) 25, 1000, 100, 10, 2 21.02± 1.29 19.9± 1.12 22.58± 1.32
19 (0.9, 0.5, 1, Low/High) 25, 2000, 10, 1, 1 21.11± 1.29 20.17± 1.12 23.6± 1.34
20 (0.9, 0.5, 1, High/High) 50, 2000, 10, 10, 2 20.78± 1.3 21.49± 1.15 23.4± 1.32
21 (0.9, 0.5, 1, Low/Low) 25, 2000, 10, 1, 1 19.75± 1.29 ? ? 15.22± 1.06 22.46± 1.34
22 (0.9, 0.5, 2, High/Low) 25, 1000, 10, 10, 1 19.4± 1.28 ? ? 14.33± 1.02 22.46± 1.35
23 (0.9, 0.5, 2, Low/High) 25, 1000, 100, 1, 1 19.62± 1.3 ? ? 14.44± 1.04 21.47± 1.31
24 (0.9, 0.5, 2, High/High) 50, 1000, 100, 10, 2 19.67± 1.29 ? ? 14.5± 1.03 21.6± 1.33
25 (0.9, 0.8, 2, Low/Low) 50, 1000, 10, 10, 1 †23± 1.34 25.83± 1.2 25.66± 1.38
26 (0.9, 0.8, 1, High/Low) 50, 2000, 10, 10, 2 †23.53± 1.36 26.98± 1.24 25.94± 1.38
27 (0.9, 0.8, 1, Low/High) 25, 1000, 10, 1, 2 23.27± 1.36 25.16± 1.21 25.91± 1.38
28 (0.9, 0.8, 1, High/High) 25, 1000, 100, 10, 2 23.25± 1.35 25.76± 1.21 25± 1.37
29 (0.9, 0.8, 2, Low/Low) 50, 1000, 10, 1, 2 21.22± 1.34 ? ? 17.95± 1.11 24.19± 1.39
30 (0.9, 0.8, 2, High/Low) 25, 1000, 10, 1, 2 21.01± 1.34 19.64± 1.15 23.83± 1.38
31 (0.9, 0.8, 2, Low/High) 25, 1000, 100, 10, 2 21.19± 1.35 ? ? 18.01± 1.12 24.53± 1.4
32 (0.9, 0.8, 2, High/High) 50, 1000, 100, 1, 1 21± 1.34 19.42± 1.17 22.74± 1.36
†† denotes statistical significance (as compared to the next best policy) with 95% confidence
† denotes statistical significance (as compared to the next best policy) with 90% confidence
?? denotes statistical significance (as compared to the ADP policy) with 95% confidence
? denotes statistical significance (as compared to the ADP policy) with 90% confidence
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The LSTD policy achieves statistically significant improvement over the two base-
line policies in 6 of the 32 test instances. The instances that show LSTD policy
superiority at the 95% confidence level are 2, 10, and 12. Instances 1, 25, and 26
show statistical significance at the 90% confidence level. LSTD attains the best mean
result in 15 of the 32 instances. We see that LSTD outperforms the baseline policies
when the duration of the conflict is short or when the enemy has weapons with a
high probability of hit. It is not surprising that in circumstances where if missed the
incoming TBM has a high likelihood of damaging its targeted asset that the LSPE
policy outperforms the baseline policies, but it is interesting that in shorter duration
conflicts when the two baseline policies show very similar means that the ADP is able
to outperform at a statistically significant level.
Figure 4. Cost Difference between High and Low Attacker Weapon Quality
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Figure 4 highlights the cost difference between LSTD and Baseline Policy 1 when
we look at the two different levels of attacker weapon quality for short and long
duration conflicts. In this we observe that for high quality attacker weapons LSTD
performs better than the baseline policy regardless of conflict duration, but for low
quality attacker weapons Baseline Policy 1 is superior for long duration conflicts.
Note that this graphic implies a linear relationship that might not exist.
Figure 5. Cost Difference between High and Medium Defender Weapon Quality
Figure 5 highlights the cost difference between LSTD and Baseline Policy 1 when
we look at the two different levels of defender weapon quality for short and long
duration conflicts. In this we observe that for medium quality defender weapons
LSTD performs better than the baseline policy regardless of conflict duration, but for
high quality defender weapons Baseline Policy 1 is always superior. Note that this
graphic implies a linear relationship that might not exist.
Table 8 shows the three-run average for the best θ-vector for each scenario. Similar
to LSPE we see robustness in our best θ-vectors with the difference between the best
and the mean damage value being around one point. Additionally, those instances
with greater than a one point difference were not the same instances that performed
significantly better than the baseline policies, suggesting that even with a different
θ-vector LSTD would still perform better for those test instances.
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Table 8. LSTD Results - Robustness
Algorithm Parameters Run 1 Run 2 Run 3 Mean Best Difference
1 25, 2000, 10, 10, 2 7.28 6.08 7.16 6.84 6.08 0.76
2 25, 2000, 10, 1, 2 6.56 6.92 6.15 6.55 6.15 0.40
3 25, 2000, 100, 1, 2 7.50 6.17 7.22 6.96 6.17 0.80
4 25, 2000, 100, 10, 2 6.71 6.05 7.01 6.59 6.05 0.54
5 25, 1000, 10, 10, 2 4.83 6.45 5.88 5.72 4.83 0.89
6 50, 2000, 10, 10, 2 5.99 5.33 4.55 5.29 4.55 0.74
7 50, 1000, 100, 10, 1 5.87 4.90 5.57 5.45 4.90 0.55
8 50, 2000, 100, 10, 2 4.88 5.19 5.41 5.16 4.88 0.28
9 25, 1000, 100, 10, 2 8.46 7.29 8.54 8.10 7.29 0.81
10 50, 1000, 10, 1, 2 8.34 9.50 7.16 8.33 7.16 1.17
11 50, 2000, 100, 10, 1 7.58 8.44 7.64 7.89 7.58 0.30
12 25, 2000, 10, 10, 1 8.51 7.31 8.50 8.10 7.31 0.80
13 25, 1000, 100, 10, 1 6.66 7.30 6.23 6.73 6.23 0.50
14 25, 1000, 10, 1, 1 6.71 7.61 6.30 6.88 6.30 0.57
15 25, 2000, 10, 10, 2 7.08 5.98 6.90 6.65 5.98 0.67
16 25, 1000, 10, 10, 1 6.14 7.02 7.13 6.76 6.14 0.63
17 25, 1000, 100, 1, 2 20.69 21.59 21.53 21.27 20.69 0.58
18 25, 1000, 100, 10, 2 21.02 22.69 22.35 22.02 21.02 1.00
19 25, 2000, 10, 1, 1 22.70 22.49 21.11 22.10 21.11 0.99
20 50, 2000, 10, 10, 2 20.78 21.86 22.28 21.64 20.78 0.86
21 25, 2000, 10, 1, 1 20.51 19.75 20.62 20.29 19.75 0.55
22 25, 1000, 10, 10, 1 20.58 19.40 20.73 20.24 19.40 0.83
23 25, 1000, 100, 1, 1 21.20 19.62 21.29 20.70 19.62 1.08
24 50, 1000, 100, 10, 2 20.91 19.67 20.85 20.48 19.67 0.81
25 50, 1000, 10, 10, 1 24.69 24.85 23.00 24.18 23.00 1.18
26 50, 2000, 10, 10, 2 26.31 23.53 24.24 24.69 23.53 1.17
27 25, 1000, 10, 1, 2 25.32 23.90 23.27 24.16 23.27 0.90
28 25, 1000, 100, 10, 2 23.43 23.89 23.25 23.52 23.25 0.27
29 50, 1000, 10, 1, 2 22.94 23.36 21.22 22.51 21.22 1.29
30 25, 1000, 10, 1, 2 21.01 22.24 23.05 22.10 21.01 1.09
31 25, 1000, 100, 10, 2 22.68 22.88 21.19 22.25 21.19 1.06
32 50, 1000, 100, 1, 1 21.00 24.84 22.60 22.81 21.00 1.81
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Meta Analysis
Table 9. Parameter Estimates - LSTD
Estimate Standard Error t Ratio Probability < |t|
Intercept -122.76 0.21 -584.40 < 0.0001
N (outer loops) 0.00 0.00 0.57 0.57
k (inner loops) 0.00 0.00 0.1 0.92
a (smoothing) 0.00 0.00 -0.34 0.73
η (regularization) 0.00 0.00 -0.53 0.60
φ (basis function set) 0.00 0.01 -0.32 0.75
Conflict Duration 157.50 0.23 699.06 < 0.0001
Attacker Weapon Quality 5.84 0.08 77.8 < 0.0001
Defender Weapon Quality 0.73 0.01 64.44 < 0.0001
Asset 1 Value 0.00 0.00 -0.27 0.78
Asset 2 Value 0.00 0.00 0.56 0.58
R-Square Adj 0.99
Unlike the meta analysis conducted for LSPE, when we look at the parameter
estimates in Table 9 for the LSTD policy performance, we find that only conflict
duration, attacker weapon quality, and defender weapon quality have a significant
impact on the mean damage incurred. In fact, with the LSTD algorithm, none of
the other terms had values anywhere close to statistical significance. The LSTD
algorithm performed nearly as well as LSPE against the two baseline policies, so
this might show that the LSTD algorithm performs well, regardless of parameter
settings. However, it also suggests that better parameter settings might exist that
would allow LSTD to perform better. Future research should include an expanded
region of experimentation with respect to the LSTD algorithmic feature space.
4.4 ADP Algorithm Comparison
When comparing LSPE to LSTD we see in Table 10 that LSPE proves superior
in 19 of the 32 scenarios. LSTD appears to perform better when duration is short,
attacker weapon quality is low, and defender weapon quality is high. Alternately,
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when duration is long, attacker weapon quality is low, and defender weapon quality
is high LSTD also performs better. In most of the other problem instances LSPE is
either superior or equal to LSTD.
Table 10. Algorithm Comparison
Best ADP Algorithm
Best # of Scenarios
LSPE 19
LSTD 11
Tie 2
4.5 Focused Analysis for Selected Instances
To explore why LSTD performed statistically better than the baseline policies
in Instance 12, why LSPE performed statistically better in Instance 10, and why
Baseline Policy 1 performed statistically better in Instance 24, we conducted a series
of sensitivity analyses where we varied the surface to air missile (SAM) site inventories.
We investigated when the SAM site was low (25% of its starting inventory) and when
it was high (75% of its starting inventory). We looked at what actions the ADP
algorithm took versus the baseline for different inventory combinations of the Aegis,
THAAD, and Patriot systems having a low or high starting condition.
Instance 12, LSPE Focused Analysis
Instance 12 from Section 4.2 is a shorter duration conflict with high quality at-
tacker weapons, medium quality defender weapons, a high-valued Asset 1, and a
low-valued Asset 2. Table 11 shows the results of running 2000 simulations starting
at the different inventory levels. Looking at when the Aegis, THAAD, and Patriot
all have low inventories we see that LSPE no longer performs statistically better than
the Baseline Policy 1. In fact LSPE only performs better when at least two of the
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SAM sites have high inventory statuses. Recall from Table 4 that Baseline Policy 2
(firing two interceptors each) outperformed Baseline Policy 1 (firing one interceptor)
in Instance 12, albeit at a non-significant level. Now in this Low/Low/Low inventory
vignette we see that Baseline Policy 2 performs significantly worse than LSPE and
Baseline Policy 1. In fact as we look across all the investigated inventories for In-
stance 12, we observe that Baseline Policy 2 performs significantly worse, even with
a High/High/High inventory status. This observation suggests that only when the
SAM sites are fully stocked with interceptors does Baseline Policy 2 perform well.
LSPE performs better at a statistically significant level when all SAM site inventory
statuses are at 75%, suggesting little sensitivity in the starting inventory for this
problem instance.
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Table 11. Instance 12 Policy Performance at Different SAM Inventories
(Aegis/THAAD/Patriot)
Instance 12
Low / Low / Low
Policy 95% CI
LSPE 30.95 ± 1.35
Baseline 1 27.14 ± 1.20
Baseline 2 43.44 ± 1.78
High / Low / Low
Policy 95% CI
LSPE 21.99 ± 1.27
Baseline 1 21.53 ± 1.08
Baseline 2 40.82 ± 1.78
Low / High / High
Policy 95% CI
LSPE 19.64 ± 1.20
Baseline 1 21.95 ± 0.97
Baseline 2 29.37 ± 1.66
High / Low / High
Policy 95% CI
LSPE 19.14 ± 1.19
Baseline 1 21.32 ± 1.03
Baseline 2 34.03 ± 1.73
High / High / High
Policy 95% CI
LSPE 14.84 ± 1.08
Baseline 1 18.23 ± 0.89
Baseline 2 29.74 ± 1.65
46
Instance 10, LSTD Focused Analysis
Instance 12 from Section 4.3 is a shorter duration conflict with high quality at-
tacker weapons, medium quality defender weapons, a high-valued Asset 1, and a
high-valued Asset 2. Table 12 shows the results of running 2000 simulations start-
ing at the different inventory levels. Unlike in Instance 10 with LSPE, LSTD only
performed statistically better than Baseline Policy 1 when all SAM site inventories
were at 75%. This suggests more sensitivity to starting inventory conditions. We also
see Baseline Policy 1 outperform LSPE when at least two of the SAM sites inventory
statuses are low. With this starting condition, Baseline Policy 2 performed better
than in Instance 10 since the value of Asset 2 was high and a multiple reentry vehicle
(MeRV) TBM had split into three targets for the SAM protecting Asset 2.
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Table 12. Instance 10 Policy Performance at Different SAM Inventories
(Aegis/THAAD/Patriot)
Instance 10
Low / Low / Low
Policy 95% CI
LSTD 29.87 ± 1.34
Baseline 1 27.62 ± 1.18
Baseline 2 31.56 ± 1.37
High / Low / Low
Policy Decision 95% CI
LSTD 25.67 ± 1.33
Baseline 1 23.2 ± 1.12
Baseline 2 28.36 ± 1.34
Low / High / High
Policy Decision 95% CI
LSTD 20.39 ± 1.21
Baseline 1 22.32 ± 0.98
Baseline 2 20.4 ± 1.21
High / Low / High
Policy Decision 95% CI
LSTD 20.58 ± 1.22
Baseline 1 22.29 ± 1.09
Baseline 2 25.53 ± 1.30
High / High / High
Policy Decision 95% CI
LSTD 14.27 ± 1.07
Baseline 1 17.69 ± 0.90
Baseline 2 21.61 ± 1.24
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Instance 24, Baseline Policy 1 Focused Analysis
Instance 24 from Section 4.2 and Section 4.3 is a long duration conflict with low
quality attacker weapons, high quality defender weapons, a high valued Asset 1, and
a high valued Asset 2. Table 12 shows the results of running 2000 simulations start-
ing at the different inventory levels. We observe no statistical difference between the
performance of LSPE and LSTD in this vignette suggesting that these two algorithms
perform the same for Instance 24. In all of the investigated initial SAM site inven-
tories, we find that Baseline Policy 1 significantly outperforms the ADP algorithms.
We find through these vignettes that even when the two terminal SAM sites have low
interceptor inventories that the APD algorithms continue to fire two interceptors at
each incoming TBM. This shows a lack of value placed on interceptor inventory. The
basis function could be modified to a traditional inventory control problem by adding
an indicator variable to find the right interceptor inventory to switch from firing two
interceptors at each TBM to firing just one interceptor.
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Table 13. Instance 24 Policy Performance at Different SAM Inventories
(Aegis/THAAD/Patriot)
Instance 24
High / Low / Low
Policy 95% CI
Baseline 1 30.31 ± 1.36
LSPE 36.94 ± 1.42
LSTD 36.23 ± 1.43
Low / High / High
Policy Decision 95% CI
Baseline 1 25.02 ± 1.24
LSPE 32.63 ± 1.40
LSTD 32.02 ± 1.40
High / Low / High
Policy Decision 95% CI
Baseline 1 24.13 ± 1.19
LSPE 31.25 ± 1.37
LSTD 30.21 ± 1.36
High / High / Low
Policy Decision 95% CI
Baseline 1 26.52 ± 1.30
LSPE 33.07 ± 1.41
LSTD 32.6 ± 1.42
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V. Conclusions, Recommendations, and Future Research
As tactical ballistic missiles (TBMs) become more readily accessible to threat
nations around the world and as near-peer threats continue to develop more techno-
logically advanced TBMs, the United States must maintain superiority with advanced
air defense systems. However, many of the current systems the United States and
its allies employ are decades old, and there are not significant improvement on the
immediate horizon. This situation requires the United States to employ a networked
defense-in-depth to best utilize the air defense systems in the current inventory. As
the integrated air and missile defense (IAMD) system becomes operational, the air
defense community must reconsider what the best firing strategy is for the limited
interceptor inventory.
The Markov decision process (MDP) allows us to look at the dynamic weapon
target assignment problem (WTAP) in an elegant manner and obtain optimal firing
decisions given small instances. This allows a starting point for comparing the ad-
equacy of other heuristics that can then be used in larger models that are of more
interest to the air defense community.
One option for moving to those larger problem instances is the use of approximate
dynamic programming (ADP). We utilized both the Least Squares Policy Evaluation
(LSPE) and Least Squares Temporal Difference (LSTD) algorithms. We looked at
the current policy of firing two interceptors at each incoming TBM and an additional
policy of only firing one interceptor. We conducted 2000 runs of each of the 32 problem
instances for the two baseline policies and all of the LSPE and LSTD parameter
settings.
The large number of simulations gave us the best chance of finding statistical
significance in an acceptable amount of time. Had we run closer to 10,000 runs, we
likely would have found statistical significance for most of the problem instances.
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LSPE outperformed both baseline policies in 3 of the 32 problem instances at
the 95% confidence level and an additional 5 instances at the 90% confidence level.
Though not at a level of statistical significance, LSPE outperformed the baseline
policies in an additional 6 problem instances and was only outperformed by Baseline
Policy 1 in 6 problem instances.
With little change between the 3 replications of each algorithmic parameter setting
investigated, we found that the best parameter setting for each problem instance
showed robustness, and we found through focused analysis that the algorithms were
not sensitive to starting inventory levels, which is not desirable.
Similarly, LSTD outperformed both baseline policies in 3 of the 32 problem in-
stances at the 95% confidence level and an additional 3 instances at the 90% confi-
dence level. Though not to a level of statistical significance, LSTD outperformed the
baseline policies in an additional 10 problem instances and was only outperformed by
Baseline Policy 1 in 6 problem instances.
With little change between the 3 replications of each algorithmic parameter setting
investigated, we found that the best parameter setting for each problem instance
showed robustness, and we found through focused analysis that the algorithms were
not sensitive to starting inventory levels, which is not desirable.
Baseline Policy 1 outperformed both ADP algorithms in 6 of the 32 instances
and performed statistically the same as them in 16 of the investigated instances. We
found that when conflict duration was short or when defender weapon quality was
lower that Baseline Policy 1 did not perform well, but when the duration was long
and the defender weapon quality was high, this policy performed as well if not better
than the ADP algorithms.
As the IAMD network is employed in the field and the full host of air defense assets
are integrated, the air defense community must consider a movement to either an ADP
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policy, Baseline Policy 1, or some mix of its current policy, Baseline Policy 2, and
Baseline Policy 1. Our analysis indicates that the current policy does not outperform
the ADP policies to a statistically significant level in any of the problem instances.
Though it does outperform Baseline Policy 1 in short-duration, low-defender-quality
weapon instances, this could be easily corrected with a static policy directing when
to change from firing one interceptor to firing two interceptors based on the expected
number of salvos, interceptor inventory, and the interceptors probability of kill
This work assumed the attacker would not know what battle damage (BDA)
occurred from the TBMs they fired and would therefore continue to fire interceptors at
destroyed targets or targets with lower remaining values than other available targets.
This could be made more realistic if we assume the attacker would have visibility of
their BDA by having the attacker fire based on the remaining asset value.
Based on the problem instances where the ADP algorithms performed poorly
against Baseline Policy 1, we might consider a new basis function set that includes an
indicator function that allows the firing decision to change from firing two interceptors
to one based on interceptor inventory. This would allow the ADP policy to continue
to outperform Baseline Policy 1 in the instances it already does, but also perform at
least as well in the instances where Baseline Policy 1 currently outperforms.
This work assumed that the traditional TBM and the TBM with multiple reentry
vehicles (MeRV) caused the same amount of damage. It is unlikely that the smaller
MeRV warheads would cause as much damage as a traditional warhead. Therefore,
another change to enhance the realism would be to investigate how different damage
levels from the warhead impacts the decisions. It is likely that with a lower damage
level for the MeRV, the ADP policy might ignore MeRVs in the terminal phase when
interceptor inventory levels are low.
Due to computational constraints for this work, we only allowed the opportunity
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to fire one wave of interceptors at the mid-course and one wave at the terminal
phase. To truly investigate the firing solution of shoot-shoot-look or shoot-look-shoot
problem, we might allow two waves of interceptors at the mid-course and two at the
terminal phase. This works off the assumption that there is time during those phases
to fire one set of interceptors at incoming TBMs, assess which were destroyed, and
then if any TBMs remain, fire another set of interceptors. This, however, increases
the size of the state space substantially since instead of the 12 current points in space
where a TBM could exist it would be 24.
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Appendix A. Quad Chart
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